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Rethinking Tax Benefits  
for Home Owners
Andrew Hanson, Ike Brannon,  
and Zackary Hawley
The individual income-ta x code offers a multitude of ben-eﬁts for home owners. The largest in dollar terms, and the most 
apparent to taxpayers, is the mortgage-interest deduction, which allows 
home owners to deduct the interest paid on up to a $1 million mortgage 
and up to $100,000 in additional debt backed by home equity. But the tax 
code also tilts the balance toward home owners by allowing a deduction 
for state and local property taxes and exempting from taxes the capital 
gains from the sale of a home. These preferences for home ownership 
fall under the umbrella of “tax expenditures,” or provisions that create 
special beneﬁts by lowering tax liabilities. Tax expenditures technically 
reduce the amount of taxes paid, but they resemble direct spending pro-
grams more than they do typical tax laws. The tax beneﬁts for home 
ownership are thus essentially subsidies.
Although tax expenditures for housing are not real line items in a 
budget the way other spending programs are, they have real effects on 
the economy by creating incentives, lowering receipts, raising the debt, 
and causing tax rates to be higher than they otherwise would be. The 
cost of the tax beneﬁts for owner-occupied housing adds up to about $175 
billion annually, with the mortgage-interest deduction alone costing the 
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Treasury roughly $100 billion. The ﬁve-year costs of these tax beneﬁts 
total well over $1 trillion. To put this amount in perspective, one year 
of tax beneﬁts for owner-occupied housing costs more than the discre-
tionary budgets of the departments of Education, Homeland Security, 
Energy, and Agriculture combined.
Proponents of these generous tax beneﬁts often justify them by argu-
ing that they encourage home ownership, which in turn is said to offer 
society all manner of social and civic beneﬁts. In reality, however, it is 
far from clear whether mass home ownership is inherently beneﬁcial to 
our society or even to individual home owners. But whatever the merits 
of owning a home, the data regarding the reach and distribution of the 
various tax beneﬁts we offer owners show that these beneﬁts do not in 
fact encourage such ownership in any meaningful way. Most Americans 
receive no beneﬁt from the preferential tax treatment of home owner-
ship, and those who do see such beneﬁts tend to be high-income earners 
who own large, expensive homes, and who are therefore unlikely to be 
on the fence about whether to buy or rent.
In fact, the tax beneﬁts afforded to home owners are highly regressive, 
extremely expensive, and of little obvious value to society at large. Even if 
we do want to encourage home ownership through the tax code — and it 
is by no means obvious that we should — there are far better ways to do 
so. By considering the ﬂaws in the tax treatment of housing and examin-
ing how our housing-related tax beneﬁts are distributed across incomes 
and across the country, we may come to see how these policies might be 
transformed to better serve owners, renters, and taxpayers.
who benefits ?
The value of the tax beneﬁts for home ownership depends on housing costs 
and income, since the breaks are larger for larger mortgages and amount to 
more savings for people in higher tax brackets. This leads to, among other 
things, wide variations in beneﬁts among states and metropolitan areas, as 
incomes and home prices differ substantially across the country. Incomes 
and home prices tend to be higher in the suburbs of major cities and along 
the East and West Coasts, while the downtown neighborhoods and inner-
ring suburbs of most cities as well as the more rural regions of the country 
tend to have incomes and home prices that are lower.
A look at the distribution of the largest tax break for housing, the 
mortgage-interest deduction, reveals a stark difference between the 
National Affairs  ·  Spr ing 2014
42
beneﬁt that accrues to those earning more than $100,000 a year and those 
earning less. The difference between taxpayers on either side of that di-
vide is generally consistent across metropolitan areas of the country. In 
most cities, tax ﬁlers with an income above $100,000 are between three 
and four times more likely to take advantage of the mortgage-interest 
deduction than are taxpayers below that income level.
At ﬁrst glance, these data appear to be consistent with the story that 
the mortgage-interest deduction beneﬁts a vast majority of taxpayers: After 
all, more than 80% of taxpayers earning over $100,000 in Atlanta, Denver, 
Detroit, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Seattle, and Washington, 
D.C., claim the deduction. But it is important to recognize that only about 
10% of taxpayers have adjusted gross incomes in excess of $100,000. Of 
those earning below that level, only 25% take advantage of the mortgage-
interest deduction.
Among major metropolitan areas, Minneapolis has by far the most 
taxpayers who earn less than $100,000 but take the deduction, at 31.5%. But 
even there the gap between taxpayers under and over $100,000 in adjusted 
gross income is large, as nearly 85% of those earning more than $100,000 
beneﬁt from the deduction. Houston has the smallest percentage of tax-
payers under $100,000 who beneﬁt from the deduction, with just under 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 
<$100K: 31.49%
>$100K: 84.87%
Washington, D.C.
<$100K: 27.65%
>$100K: 82.83%
Denver
<$100K: 29.32%
>$100K: 82.73%
Dallas
<$100K: 18.00%
>$100K: 73.60%
Houston
<$100K: 15.84%
>$100K: 67.69%
Phoenix 
<$100K: 28.38%
>$100K: 81.92%
Los Angeles
<$100K: 19.02%
>$100K: 74.97%
San Francisco 
<$100K: 20.40%
>$100K: 72.40%
Seattle
<$100K: 25.64%
>$100K: 84.76%
Atlanta 
<$100K: 28.62%
>$100K: 84.76%
Chicago
<$100K: 24.71%
>$100K: 78.40%
Detroit
<$100K: 26.34%
>$100K: 80.40%
Philadelphia
<$100K: 23.25%
>$100K: 80.35%
New York City
<$100K: 16.80%
>$100K: 70.72%
Boston
<$100K: 21.49%
>$100K: 77.47%
share of filers benefit ing from the 
mortgage- interest deduct ion across  large metro areas, 
by  adjusted gross  income
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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16% receiving any tax savings, while more than four times that proportion 
of Houston taxpayers earning more than $100,000 beneﬁt from the deduc-
tion. Even in areas with relatively more taxpayers claiming the deduction, 
the percentage of those earning less than $100,000 who beneﬁt from it 
hovers between 20% and 30%, while the share of tax ﬁlers with incomes 
above that level who beneﬁt is between three and four times larger.
Considering that national opinion polls show support for the mortgage-
interest deduction ranging between 60% and 90% of the populace, 
there seem to be many Americans who believe they beneﬁt from the 
deduction when they actually do not. This is surely to some extent a 
function of the popular view that the mortgage-interest deduction in-
creases home values, but in fact, as we shall see, the deduction inﬂates 
those values across the board, which should appeal only to people who 
want to sell their current homes but not buy new ones. Any move away 
from the deduction would certainly have to involve a gradual and care-
ful transition to avoid deﬂating that effect too quickly, but home-price 
inﬂation hardly justiﬁes the deduction.
The strong public support for the mortgage-interest deduction may 
also be due in part to the fact that taxpayers think the amount of sav-
ings that they receive through the deduction is large compared to the 
savings that others receive, and that their resulting tax savings are pro-
portionally higher. But most people are surely wrong to think so.
A look at the data shows that there are vast differences among 
Americans in the amount of tax savings received from the mortgage-
interest deduction, but it is a small minority that sees most of the savings. 
The average tax savings for the 10% of households earning over $100,000 is 
more than double the savings enjoyed by the 90% of households with in-
comes below that level. In San Francisco, residents earning over $100,000 
save $8,000 a year from the deduction, compared to an average savings of 
about $3,700 for residents in that area earning under $100,000.
It is also clear that the tax savings from the deduction in places like 
San Francisco dwarf the savings in other parts of the country, even for 
those earning over $100,000. For example, the high-income group in 
Detroit saves just over $4,000 in tax payments as a result of the deduc-
tion, just about half the amount saved by high-income home owners 
in San Francisco. Those earning less than $100,000 in Detroit average a 
savings of less than half that of the high-income residents there, or about 
$1,600 annually.
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Indeed, the distribution of tax savings from the mortgage-interest 
deduction makes it clear that people living in certain parts of California 
enjoy a far greater beneﬁt (regardless of income level) than does the rest 
of the country. This difference is a function of the high home prices in 
that state, but even the beneﬁts in high-home-price environments are 
concentrated among the top 10% of taxpayers.
The average benefit for lower-earning households in places 
like Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Minneapolis, and 
Philadelphia doesn’t even reach $2,000 per year, while in many other 
cities the beneﬁt is just slightly more than $2,000 for this income group. 
Comparing both income groups and metropolitan areas shows clear evi-
dence of the skewed beneﬁts of the deduction and makes it clear that it 
is a narrow segment of higher-income households living in high-priced 
areas that beneﬁt most from the policy.
The dramatic variation in beneﬁts across incomes and metropoli-
tan areas is further exacerbated by intra-metropolitan differences in 
beneﬁts. The structure of most American metropolitan areas — with 
relatively wealthy exurban areas surrounding less well-to-do inner-
ring suburbs and poorer inner-city areas — yields another dimension 
on which the beneﬁts from the mortgage-interest deduction differ 
quite dramatically.
Minneapolis-St. Paul 
<$100K: $1,946
>$100K: $4,528
Washington, D.C.
<$100K: $2,815
>$100K: $6,101
Denver
<$100K: $2,199
>$100K: $5,183
Dallas
<$100K: $1,474
>$100K: $4,004
Houston
<$100K: $1,428
>$100K: $3,538
Phoenix 
<$100K: $2,417
>$100K: $5,849
Los Angeles
<$100K: $3,210
>$100K: $7,548
San Francisco 
<$100K: $3,667
>$100K: $8,039
Seattle
<$100K: $2,541
>$100K: $5,716
Atlanta 
<$100K: $1,794
>$100K: $4,894
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<$100K: $1,918
>$100K: $4,819
Detroit
<$100K: $1,582
>$100K: $4,053
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<$100K: $1,616
>$100K: $4,316
New York City
<$100K: $2,160
>$100K: $5,346
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<$100K: $2,101
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tax sav ings from the mortgage- interest deduct ion 
across  large metro areas, 
by  adjusted gross  income
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The difference between urban and suburban areas is the largest in 
Detroit, where twice the proportion of suburbanites claim the deduction 
as compared to central-city residents. In cities such as Boston, Dallas, 
Denver, Minneapolis, Phoenix, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., 
suburban residents are 50% more likely to deduct mortgage interest than 
central-city residents, and the ratio is slightly higher in Atlanta, Chicago, 
Houston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.
Still, while suburban taxpayers are more likely to claim the deduction 
than those living in the center of the city, the average tax savings for the tax-
payers who do claim the deduction are roughly the same: The differences 
in tax savings between suburbanites and central-city residents as a result of 
the deduction are within $100 for Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, and 
Seattle, and the largest differences — in Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, 
Phoenix, and San Francisco — are no more than $900.
CENTR AL CITIES SUBUR BS
% with 
MID beneﬁt
Average Tax 
Savings for 
MID ﬁlers
% with 
MID beneﬁt
Average Tax 
Savings for 
MID ﬁlers
Atlanta 24.05% $2,189 39.20% $2,221
Boston 23.84% $2,639 36.51% $2,669
Chicago 21.27% $2,362 36.70% $2,363
Dallas 19.20% $1,627 30.08% $1,941
Denver 29.41% $2,317 46.66% $3,012
Detroit 17.97% $1,200 37.04% $2,054
Houston 14.28% $1,745 25.72% $1,719
Los Angeles 17.04% $3,261 30.06% $3,978
Minneapolis-St. Paul 32.01% $2,085 45.18% $2,521
New York 15.06% $2,460 31.38% $2,790
Philadelphia 22.49% $1,491 37.25% $2,302
Phoenix 28.16% $2,427 42.08% $3,229
San Francisco 24.15% $4,195 37.65% $4,894
Seattle 30.42% $3,048 38.25% $3,122
Washington, D.C. 30.92% $3,191 44.72% $3,707
Source: Authors’ calculations.
tax sav ings from mortgage- interest deduct ion  
in centr al cit ies  and suburbs 
across  large metro areas
National Affairs  ·  Spr ing 2014
46
benefits upon benefits
The mortgage-interest deduction is the most visible and widely dis-
cussed tax break for housing, but it is by no means the only one. Uncle 
Sam also allows home owners to deduct the amount they pay in state 
and local property taxes, and most capital gains from a sale of a home is 
excluded from taxable income. The capital-gains allowance is generous: 
Most taxpayers are not responsible for income-tax payments upon real-
izing even a $250,000 gain from the sale of their home.
Of course, the value of the capital-gains allowance is highly depen-
dent on selling a home in a hot housing market. People in areas that 
experience house-price appreciation greatly beneﬁt from this tax break, 
while those in areas with slow or negative price growth barely notice its 
existence. The beneﬁt from the property-tax deduction similarly varies by 
geography. Not only is the property-tax deduction tied to housing values, 
but it is also tied to the quality of local public services that are funded 
through the property tax—especially schools. Areas that spend a lot on 
schools typically raise that money through the property tax, and residents 
of those areas are afforded a larger deduction because of it.
The map above shows how these tax expenditures (including the 
mortgage-interest deduction) change the annual cost of ownership 
for taxpayers in different parts of the country. The calculation of cost 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 
$2,279
Washington, D.C.
$9,216
Denver
$2,744
Dallas
$2,906
Houston
$3,371
Phoenix 
$2,637
Los Angeles
$10,651
San Francisco 
$12,274
Seattle
$6,342
Atlanta 
$1,628
Chicago
$4,134
Detroit
$1,598
Philadelphia
$5,519
New York City
$10,446
Boston
$6,356
annual cost of housing sav ings from tax expendit ures 
across  large metro areas
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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savings from tax expenditures takes into account differences in income-
tax rates, debt-to-value ratios, property taxes, and local home-price 
inﬂation, but not differences in interest rates or other costs, such as 
maintenance and depreciation.
These total cost savings from the preferred tax treatment of housing 
across metropolitan areas show even larger differences between areas 
than those revealed by looking at the mortgage-interest deduction alone. 
The total savings in housing costs from the tax code range from over 
$12,000 annually in San Francisco to under $1,600 in Detroit. The aver-
age annual beneﬁt of housing-related tax expenditures exceeds $10,000 
in both New York and Los Angeles, while it is under $3,000 in Atlanta, 
Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, and Phoenix. The Washington, D.C., area 
also has a relatively high beneﬁt at over $9,000 per year, whereas places 
like Chicago and Houston have comparatively lower beneﬁts, at $4,134 
and $3,371 per year, respectively.
Housing tax expenditures are clearly more valuable in places where 
house prices have maintained strong appreciation like San Francisco 
and in places with high local property taxes like New York. Places 
with low property taxes like Houston or negative price appreciation (as 
Detroit has had until recently) receive very little annual beneﬁt from the 
package of housing tax expenditures.
what the benefit  buys
The skewed distribution of beneﬁts from the mortgage-interest deduc-
tion and the larger package of housing-related tax beneﬁts demonstrates 
that just a handful of areas, and a handful of taxpayers within those 
areas, receive most of the beneﬁt from these generous provisions. This 
raises the question of just what society actually gets for $175 billion per 
year. The answer, it seems, is that we do not get very much.
To begin with, empirical studies have made it reasonably clear that 
these large tax expenditures do not appreciably increase the home-
ownership rate. Economists have examined the data in two different 
ways — by considering how the generosity of the policies has changed 
over time and how it varies with geography. Both methods point to the 
same conclusion: The generosity of the mortgage-interest deduction is 
not correlated with home-ownership rates.
But if housing-related tax beneﬁts, and especially the deduction for 
mortgage interest, are not increasing American home-ownership rates, 
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then what function do they serve in housing markets? Evidence shows 
that, rather than encouraging the purchase of homes by people who 
might otherwise only rent, the mortgage-interest deduction instead en-
courages the purchase of larger homes by people who would otherwise 
own smaller ones. Estimates show that the generosity of this deduction 
alone increases the average size of homes by between 11% and 18%. This 
is certainly evident in the size of homes Americans purchase, as the aver-
age home purchased today is more than 2,500 square feet—more than 
400 square feet larger than the average in 1990 and more than 750 square 
feet larger than the average in 1980.
Of course, it is not just the mortgage-interest deduction but the com-
bination of all housing tax preferences that makes a larger home more 
appealing to buyers. The data on the map below combine the cost sav-
ings from all tax expenditures to show how much larger homes are in 
different parts of the country because of these tax breaks.
The additional square footage purchased because of housing’s tax-
preferred status varies among metropolitan areas, just as the cost savings 
from these policies do. At the high end of the spectrum, estimates suggest 
that homes are substantially larger due to housing tax expenditures—as 
much as 1,400 square feet larger in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
addit ional aver age home size  purchase from  
tax at ion preference on housing  
across  large metro areas
Minneapolis-St. Paul 
274 sq. ft.
Washington, D.C.
1,424 sq. ft.
Denver
391 sq. ft.
Dallas
544 sq. ft.
Houston
637 sq. ft.
Phoenix 
427 sq. ft.
Los Angeles
1,082 sq. ft.
San Francisco 
643 sq. ft.
Seattle
688 sq. ft.
Atlanta 
304 sq. ft.
Chicago
540 sq. ft.
Detroit
262 sq. ft.
Philadelphia
1,028 sq. ft.
New York City
840 sq. ft.
Boston
734 sq. ft.
Source: Estimates of increased square footage from Andrew Hanson, “Size of Home, Homeownership, and the Mortgage Interest Deduction,” 
Journal of Housing Economics, 21:3, 2012.
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area. In other areas, like Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and New York City, 
the effect of housing tax expenditures on the size of homes is smaller but 
still quite signiﬁcant, encouraging people to buy homes that are at least 
800 square feet larger. Even at the bottom of the distribution, tax beneﬁts 
still have a real effect, increasing home sizes by more than 250 square 
feet in all metropolitan areas. And it is worth noting that these estimates 
include only purchases of owner-occupied single-family homes, so they 
do not account for purchases of larger condominiums and necessarily 
exclude all rental properties.
Beyond pushing home sizes upward, the tax preferences for home 
ownership shape home buyers’ behavior in several other ways. Because 
the mortgage-interest deduction can be applied to both a primary and 
secondary residence, it almost surely encourages those with the necessary 
means to purchase vacation homes — hardly a great social good worthy 
of taxpayer subsidies. In addition, the fact that the deduction applies to 
the portion of a home ﬁnanced with debt (rather than household savings) 
encourages more debt ﬁnancing than would otherwise be the case.
The increase in home sizes, encouragement of second-home pur-
chases, and preference for debt ﬁnancing are all examples of how 
housing’s tax preferences distort consumer behavior. All of those 
changes in behavior lead to enormous amounts of misplaced economic 
activity: If these policies did not exist, consumers would likely purchase 
smaller homes using less debt. That misplaced economic activity is what 
economists call deadweight loss — a measure of all of the things that 
people do too much of as a result of an economic distortion like a sub-
sidy created by the tax code. A recent estimate of the deadweight loss 
from the mortgage-interest deduction using Internal Revenue Service 
data from actual tax claims found that it is responsible for between $17 
and $38 billion annually in misplaced economic activity.
So why isn’t an increase in home ownership among the distortions 
attributed to the mortgage-interest deduction? The deduction certainly 
changes the annual cost of owning a home — making it cheaper through 
the savings on an owner’s annual tax bill. But the mortgage-interest de-
duction does not do a good job of targeting funds to subsidize marginal 
home owners, or those who are deciding between renting and owning 
a home. Instead, it provides generous tax breaks to those who would 
own a home regardless of the tax treatment, even if it might be a slightly 
smaller home.
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The mortgage-interest deduction is not well targeted because it 
works as a tax deduction, meaning that for every dollar paid in mort-
gage interest, a taxpayer subtracts one dollar from the income he pays 
taxes on. The amount a taxpayer saves from the deduction is a function 
of the top marginal tax rate he pays. Since higher earners tend to pay a 
higher top rate, the exact same deduction will, in fact, be more valuable 
to taxpayers at the top of the income distribution. At the same time, 
using the mortgage-interest deduction requires taxpayers to itemize 
deductions — meaning they ﬁll out a form listing all of their varied de-
ductions instead of just checking a box to take the standard deduction. 
Nearly all middle- and low-income taxpayers take the standard deduc-
tion, making the subsidy created by the mortgage-interest deduction 
completely useless to them. The current standard deduction of $12,200 
for married couples, while making their tax-ﬁling process simple, makes 
the mortgage-interest deduction useless for almost anyone truly on the 
margin between owning and renting.
For middle-class families, the standard deduction is also usually the 
best option, since it constitutes a sizeable fraction of their income and it 
would take a lot of spending on tax-deductible goods and services to have 
itemized deductions that exceed the optional standard deduction. For 
instance, on a $200,000, 30-year mortgage at 4%, interest payments add 
up to only $8,000 the ﬁrst year and gradually decline in subsequent years. 
If we assume that this family faces a property tax of 1% and gives 2% of 
its income to charity — roughly the national averages for each — then 
the three biggest deductions in the code for this prototypical household 
add up to the standard deduction. In other words, this family would not 
reduce its tax bill at all by purchasing a house. And for the 90% of all U.S. 
households with incomes below $146,400 (which was the upper threshold 
for the 25% tax bracket in 2013), each dollar above the standard deduction 
reduces their federal tax bill by a mere 25 cents at most. The system of tax 
expenditures thus offers virtually no incentive for middle-class families 
to purchase a home.
The difference in average tax savings between income groups can 
be attributed to both the higher marginal tax rate, which means each 
dollar deducted from one’s taxable income saves more money, and the 
fact that upper-income taxpayers have 60% more mortgage interest to 
deduct. They have more interest because they can buy more expensive 
homes and take on more debt. A doubling of income more than doubles 
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the expected tax savings from the mortgage-interest deduction, as it 
boosts the family into a higher tax bracket and proportionally increases 
the amount they can borrow to purchase a home.
A household with an income of $500,000 can afford a $1 million 
mortgage, while a family earning near the national median income of 
$51,000 would struggle to afford more than 20% of that. But the tax code 
awards the $500,000 household that has the larger mortgage a much 
larger subsidy. A million-dollar mortgage at 4% for this family results in 
a tax savings of nearly $16,000 a year, or more than ten times that of the 
family with the national median income buying a house at the median 
price (about $221,000).
alternative avenues
Commonsense reforms to federal tax breaks for housing have been pro-
posed from both sides of the political aisle. President George W. Bush’s 
tax-reform panel as well as President Obama’s National Commission 
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform both recommended scaling back 
housing’s tax-preferred status. For starters, both recommended capping 
the size of mortgages that qualify for a subsidy. Bush’s tax-reform panel 
recommended a cap based on regional home prices, while Obama’s 
commission recommended lowering the existing cap to a national limit 
of $500,000. They both also recommended eliminating the deductibil-
ity of mortgage interest in favor of a more straightforward tax credit.
Capping the size of mortgages that qualify for the mortgage-interest 
deduction would work toward limiting the subsidy for purchasing a larger 
home and reduce much of the geographic and economic disparity in the 
subsidy. Switching the deduction to a tax credit, where its value would 
not be a function of income but instead be a ﬂat rate, would further limit 
the subsidy provided to upper-income taxpayers while simultaneously ex-
panding it at the lower end of the income distribution.
To have a greater effect at the ownership margin, policymakers might 
also consider making the credit refundable for lower-income taxpayers, 
which would allow the credit to be part of taxpayers’ refunds instead 
of just reducing their tax liabilities to zero. Other more modest steps 
toward using subsidy dollars to encourage ownership could include 
eliminating tax breaks on anything but a primary residence, limiting 
the amount of housing-capital gains that is exempt from taxation, or 
capping the tax rate that applies to deductions.
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Making the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing less generous 
would also generate additional revenues that could be used to lower the 
debt or reduce tax rates. Estimates show that eliminating the mortgage-
interest deduction completely would likely generate between $41 and $73 
billion annually, even after considering that taxpayers would adjust their 
behavior in response to the change. Replacing the mortgage-interest 
deduction with a tax credit, which would work to increase home owner-
ship, would also generate substantial revenues. Even with the reduction 
in revenues expected from increased use of the beneﬁt by lower-income 
taxpayers, switching to a 15% tax credit, for instance, would yield be-
tween $17 and $25 billion annually.
A 15% tax credit in place of the mortgage-interest deduction would be 
better targeted to those who are truly on the margin between owning and 
renting, but it would still be relatively expensive. Other ideas that have 
been generated at the state level would be much less expensive and may 
have similar effects on ownership without the unintended consequence 
of encouraging the purchase of larger homes. For example, the Wisconsin 
Housing and Economic Development Authority offers assistance to ﬁrst-
time home buyers up to a certain income limit (varying between about 
$65,000 and $105,000, depending on the county and number of family 
members) and purchase price. The program substantially defrays the clos-
ing costs that come with purchasing a home, which can pose a serious 
impediment to buying a home for a young family that has not had the 
time to accumulate signiﬁcant savings. WHEDA provides the beneﬁt as a 
low-interest loan that it recoups by wrapping it into the mortgage it also 
provides, so the program costs the state nearly nothing.
Of course, any change in the tax treatment of housing would result in 
some costs for those who already own their homes. These home owners 
bought their houses under the assumption that they would receive these 
tax beneﬁts and, perhaps even more important, that any future buyer 
would also expect these beneﬁts, meaning the owner could effectively 
add the value of those beneﬁts to the price of the home. This expecta-
tion essentially inﬂates home prices. Changing the tax treatment of home 
ownership would reduce or eliminate that inﬂation, but whoever owns a 
home when the policy is eliminated would suffer all of that loss — raising 
problems of fairness, let alone of politics.
While the problem of a potential house-price decline cannot 
be avoided if tax policy is to be changed to better target it toward 
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encouraging ownership, the transition can be smoothed in ways that 
would help a great deal. The 2005 Tax Reform Panel, for instance, rec-
ommended a phased transition from current policy to a tax credit with 
regional caps based on median home prices. Lowering the limit on de-
ductibility from $1 million to $750,000 could be undertaken immediately 
with almost no effect on the broader housing market. In subsequent 
years the cap could be reduced in $100,000 increments until the desired 
level was reached. Similarly, capping the deduction at 28% immediately 
would have only a small effect on the broader housing market while a 
15% credit is phased in.
Considering the dollar amounts involved, and the fact that a home 
is easily the single biggest purchase most people ever make, it is worth 
questioning whether the government should be in the business of en-
couraging home ownership at all. Typically, the argument in favor of 
using public funds to encourage ownership is based on the idea that 
home owners produce some social beneﬁts outside of the beneﬁts they 
receive themselves. While this idea makes sense in theory, recent evi-
dence amassed by economists through randomized experiments calls 
this conventional wisdom into question. This work shows that many of 
the things that are often considered to be positive social beneﬁts of home 
ownership, like rates of voting and civic engagement, are not actually 
caused by owning a home.
Furthermore, research shows that owning a home that declines in 
value makes workers less mobile — a phenomenon known as “housing 
lock.” This is especially apparent when home owners have negative eq-
uity, or owe more on their mortgage than they could sell their house 
for. Certainly the housing bubble and subsequent bust put many recent 
home buyers in a negative-equity position, and this bust (for obvious 
reasons) hit especially hard in places that had declining labor mar-
kets. Encouraging ownership through public policy exacerbates the 
problem of housing lock, making it harder for workers to ﬁnd jobs in 
other locations by constraining them to a location with a declining 
labor market.
A gradual transition away from tax policy that encourages home 
ownership would, of course, yield even greater savings to the taxpayer 
that could be translated into lower tax rates or other tax beneﬁts, such 
as additional relief for families. It might also conﬁne government to a 
more appropriate role.
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targeting benefits
For far too long, our system of generous tax beneﬁts for home owners 
has escaped careful scrutiny and criticism. Even in tight ﬁscal times, 
when policymakers are eager to ﬁnd ways to save money, the mortgage-
interest deduction and other housing-related tax beneﬁts have remained 
unthreatened and untouched.
But if the goal of these policies is to increase home-ownership rates in 
ﬁscally sensible ways, the current package of housing-related tax expen-
ditures certainly fails. These policies unevenly beneﬁt higher-income 
residents residing in the suburbs of coastal metropolitan areas — par-
ticularly those in California. Instead of encouraging ownership, they 
tend to make housing cheaper for a small segment of the population that 
uses those savings to buy larger, more expensive homes than they would 
otherwise be able to afford.
Reforms that reduce the beneﬁt to upper-income taxpayers and expand 
coverage to those at the margin between owning a home and renting 
would increase home ownership while at the same time saving taxpayers 
a great deal of money. It is time to stop treating these beneﬁts as a third 
rail of our ﬁscal politics and to take on some much-needed reforms.
